PM in Menon line vs Airbase on China border
Posted: 20 Sep 2009 04:27 AM PDT
PM in the role of Krishna Menon, this is a wrong signal. India’s airbase is now on China border. It is a right step to correct the mistake of 1962. At that time India did not use its air force. There was no co-ordination between our three wings: Air, Navy and Army.
Dhritrashtra Nehru’s heir P M Manmohan Singh being in the role of comrade Krishna Menon says on Sept 19, 2009: Don't believe everything you see on TV or read in the papers, certainly not when it comes to China.
Hindi chini bhai bhai’ slogan was given in 1962. Due to Panchsheel agreement our Prime Minister Pt Jawahar Lal Nehru became Dhritrasthtra. Chinese soldiers entered in the laddakh and our soldiers were defending with canvas boot that slid on the snow. Our soldiers did not have even snow glasses which led to snow blindness. Still friend of Kaul comrade V K Krishna Menon was saying “Oh! They are not going to fight” On September 8, 1962 Chinese has intruded into Indian Territory south of MacMahon line.
Now at an iftar party in his house, the PM said he saw no evidence of increased aggression by Chinese troops into Indian Territory. The government has always maintained that the differing perceptions of the line of actual controlled to Chinese patrols going awry. He added that Chinese ambassador Zhang Yan had come to meet the national security adviser, MK Narayanan, on Sept 17, 2009. According to the PM, the envoy had very "good discussions" with him.
Government sources also added that the "disclosure" notification filed by China in the ADB on Arunachal Pradesh would have no impact on the project, or the funding.
There has been a spate of media reports about repeated Chinese incursions into Indian Territory in both western and eastern sectors, from Leh to Arunachal even in Sikkim. While the government blames the media, its government officials, in the security and armed services who have been leaking these stories, including photographs of Chinese characters spray-painted on rocks.
India did not use its air force in 1962 Indo China War. There was no co-ordination between our three wings: Air, Navy and Army.
AIR Leh goes hi-tech
Leh in J&K, has the world's highest radio station. The old All India Radio station-Leh has undergone a technological up gradation on May 29, 2008.
"India could have won 1962 war"
There is a report, published in The Hindu on Oct 09, 2006. India could have defeated China in the 1962 war had its air force been used, former Air Vice-Marshal A. K. Tewary said.
He claimed that the then political-bureaucratic combine sought U.S. Air Force's help and did not even consulted the IAF chief. ``In the final analysis, the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on the Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China," Air Vice-Marshal Tewary said in an article in `Indian Defence Review.'
Quoting top military and bureaucratic leadership of that time, he said the "costly and catastrophic omission" of not using the IAF was a result of several factors that ``impinged on the decision-making process at the highest level," including the "influence" on Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, of Prof. P. M. S. Blackett, the then Advisor for Defense , as well as the counsel of the U.S. Ambassador John K Galbraith who "over-estimated the capability of the Chinese air force in the absence of proper air defense infrastructure in India."
Another factor was the analysis of then Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) B. N. Mullick, a close confidant of Nehru, that Chinese bombers would bomb Indian cities in response to the use if IAF's combat jets, he said.
The former Air Vice-Marshal said "since IB did not have the firsthand knowledge [on Chinese air force capabilities], they sought help from `our good friends' [CIA]," which exaggerated the threat perception.
He quoted top defense analyst George Tanham and said that while the political-bureaucratic combine "pleaded to U.S. President John F Kennedy for 12 squadrons of Star fighters [F-104] and four squadrons of B-47 Bombers as an immediate USAF help to stem the Chinese advance, they did not deem it fit to even consult the Indian Air Force chief,"
The IAF officer said the then Army commander responsible for NEFA, Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul, had conceded in his book that "we made a great mistake in not employing our air force in a close support role during these operations."
He also quoted late National Security Advisor J. N. Dixit, who was then Under Secretary in the China Division of the External Affairs Ministry, as saying that by the time Nehru was coming round to the suggestion for use of air power, the Chinese had declared a unilateral ceasefire.
Dixit, the IAF officer said, had pointed out that the Chinese logistical arrangements and supply lines were too stretched and that it did not have sufficient air power in Tibet at that point of time.
"India's air strikes would stop the Chinese advance and neutralise the military successes which they had achieved," Dixit had said, adding that this suggestion was rejected on the grounds that it had come from officers who were not military experts.
By Premendra Agrawal
Monday, September 21, 2009
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